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We describe quantum protocols for voting and surveying. A key feature of our schemes is the
use of entangled states to ensure that the votes are anonymous and to allow the votes to be tallied.
The entanglement is distributed over separated sites; the physical inaccessibility of any one site is
sufficient to guarantee the anonymity of the votes. The security of these protocols with respect to
various kinds of attack is discussed. We also discuss classical schemes and show that our quantum
voting protocol represents a N-fold reduction in computational complexity, where N is the number
of voters.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A well-established consequence of the proven security
[1] of quantum key distribution is that quantum systems
can be used for unconditionally secure classical informa-
tion transmission. It is widely believed that classical
cryptosystems cannot distribute a key such as a one-time
pad with unconditional security. Without a one-time pad
classical cryptosystems are secure only on condition that
insufficient computational resources are available to ren-
der them vulnerable. While this assumption is reason-
able at the present time, we anticipate that, in the fu-
ture, quantum computers will be developed which may
be used to attack cryptosystems reliant upon either in-
teger factorization or discrete logarithm evaluation us-
ing, for example, Shor’s algorithm. The security of most
common cryptosystems is dependent on the fact that no
known efficient classical algorithm exists that can break
particular implementations used within the time period
for which security is desired. As such, although quan-
tum computation will bring many benefits, it will also be
highly disruptive with regard to data security.
For this reason, it is highly probable that, to create
cryptographic keys, we will have to turn to quantum me-
chanics to provide us with alternative means of estab-
lishing security. Fortunately, the practical implementa-
tion of quantum cryptography has advanced considerably
over that of quantum computation. We are therefore un-
likely to face a ‘security gap’. Indeed, the first commer-
cial quantum key distribution systems have recently ap-
peared on the market [2]. Developments such as these in-
crease our confidence in quantum cryptography and lead
us to enquire, more broadly, about which tasks requir-
ing secure communication could be implemented using
quantum states.
It is known that for some tasks, such as bit commit-
ment, quantum mechanics cannot help [3]. However, for
others, such as secret sharing, a number of novel quan-
tum protocols have been developed [4]. In an (n, k) secret
sharing scheme, a classical message is split among n par-
ties. The key property of such a scheme is that no less
than k of these parties can extract any information about
the secret, while any k of them can extract the secret in
its entirety.
In some situations, it is more desirable that the iden-
tity of the person who sent the message, rather than the
message itself, be kept secret [5]. Examples include elec-
tions, anonymous ballots and referendums. Here each
voter should should feel able to cast their vote without
the prospect of coercion or repercussion. Only collective
features of the set of votes, such as the tally of ‘yes’ and
‘no’ votes, are calculated and made public.
In this paper, we describe novel quantum protocols for
voting and a related task that we term surveying. Sur-
veying is similar to voting in most respects. The main
difference is that in surveying, the value of the vote cast
is not restricted to a binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ but may take any
integer value. As such, surveying corresponds to collect-
ing estimates of some numerical quantity, such as profit
and loss values. The identities of the people who make
each bid are kept private, although the sum of the bids
is made public. We also analyze the security of these
protocols under some simple attacks.
To set our work in context, we review in section II a se-
lection of protocols currently employed in secure classical
election schemes. We devote section III to the descrip-
tion of our protocols. The first of these is a simple quan-
tum protocol for comparative voting. Here, we consider
two parties voting on a question with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ an-
swer. The aim is not to determine the tally itself, but to
determine whether or not both parties voted identically
without knowing the value of each of the votes. We show
2that this is possible by encoding the voting information
in an entangled state.
Subsequently, we describe a protocol for anonymous
surveying. It proves robust against certain kinds of at-
tack. We discuss adaptations of the protocol for an
anonymous ballot for binary-valued ballots and the re-
lationship between the privacy of a vote and the ability
for a voter to cheat by making multiple votes. We con-
clude in section IV with a discussion of our results.
II. CLASSICAL VOTING PROTOCOLS
Various properties have emerged from the literature as
being desirable attributes of classical secret ballot vot-
ing schemes. Amongst these is the concept of resilience
which involves the properties of universal verifiability,
privacy, and robustness [6]. A universally verifiable elec-
tion scheme is a scheme deemed open to scrutiny by all in-
terested parties. Compliance with this property ensures
that ballots are carried out correctly and that subsequent
tallies are fairly assessed. For a scheme satisfying the pri-
vacy property an honest participant is assured that their
vote remains confidential, provided that the number of
attackers does not grow too large. With the property
of robustness, an election scheme has the capacity to re-
cover from faults again, provided that the number of par-
ties involved does not grow too large. Schemes satisfying
these three properties are said to be resilient. Another
desirable property of an election scheme, particularly as
a counter to the risk of vote buying or coercion, is that it
is receipt-free. Receipt-free election schemes ensure that
voters cannot prove, to other parties, the particular vote
cast within the scheme [7, 8]. Further ‘desirable proper-
ties’ are to be found in the literature, for example [9].
Voting protocols performed within a classical setting
are in general grouped according to their use of homo-
morphisms, MIX nets and blind signatures.
Homomorphic election schemes. These [6, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14] involve the use of a homomorphic, probabilis-
tic encryption scheme consisting of a plaintext space V ,
a ciphertext space C (each of which form group struc-
tures (V , ◦) and (C, ◦′) under appropriate binary opera-
tions ◦ and ◦′) together with a family of homomorphic
encryption schemes {Ei}i∈N+ such that Ei : V −→ C by
v 7→ c = Ei(v). The homomorphic property [13] may be
defined as follows: let cj = Eij (vj) and ck = Eik (vk) for
j, ij , k, ik ∈ N+; then ∃i ∈ N+ s.t. cj◦′ck = Ei(vj ◦ vk).
Homomorphic election schemes are important since they
allow one to derive tallies without the need to decrypt
individual votes. Such schemes lead to resilient election
schemes [6, 13].
MIX net schemes. MIX nets were first introduced by
Chaum [15], and have found applications in scenarios
involving anonymity, elections and payments. A MIX
net election scheme involves the use of ‘shuffle machine
agents’ referred to as MIX servers, [16] which take as
input a ciphertext vector (these could be for example,
encrypted votes) (c1, c2, ..., cn) ∈
⊕n
i=1 Ci submitted by
for example ‘voters’, (v1, ..., vn) and produces as output a
permuted vector (in which the components are shuffled)
of corresponding output (for example, decrypted votes )
such that the link between the source for each ciphertext
(‘encrypted vote’) and its resulting plaintext (’vote’) re-
mains hidden. The resilience properties of privacy, ver-
ifiability and robustness may be presented in terms of
‘t-privacy’, ‘t-verifiability’ and ‘t-robustness’, where it is
understood that t refers to the number of malicious MIX
servers that the scheme can withstand given at most n−2
malicious sources. A scheme satisfying the above three
t-properties is said to be t-resilient [17].
The development of classical MIX net schemes to
achieve, in particular, privacy initially led to cipher-
text whose size was proportional to the number of MIX
servers involved in the scheme. This problem was re-
solved by Park, Itoh and Kurosawa [16], resulting in
ciphertext whose length was independent of the number
of MIX servers. Sako and Kilian [18], produced a general
MIX net scheme satisfying verifiability but failing with
regard to robustness. The first resilient MIX net scheme
was produced by Ogata, Kurosawa, Sako and Takatani
[17, 19].
Blind signature schemes. These were also introduced
by Chaum [20], and have been developed with applica-
tions in anonymity, election and payment schemes. The
basic concept involves obtaining a signature to authenti-
cate a ‘message’, for example an encrypted vote, without
the signer being able to observe the message (‘vote’) it-
self or its signature. Verification regarding the signature
is however supported by such schemes whilst maintain-
ing privacy regarding the actual plaintext. A signer is
thus denied the ability to link a particular plaintext with
its corresponding ‘blind’ signature [21]. Variations upon
such schemes are to be found with for example ‘Fair Blind
Signatures’ [22] in which the possibility of, for example,
blackmail is discussed [23].
Sender untraceability schemes. These schemes allow
information to be sent anonymously. For example, in
Chaum’s Dining Cryptographers’ Problem [24] a group
of diners wish to determine if either an external agency
or one of the group is paying anonymously for the meal.
The solution requires 1 bit of information to be broadcast
anonymously using a communication channel available
to all diners. The simplest situation occurs for three
diners with only two possible scenarios: one diner is to
pay the bill or no diners pay the bill. The diner who pays
broadcasts the message 1 in the following way. Each diner
shares a single binary-digit one-time pad with the other
two. The broadcast is executed by each diner adding the
two numbers on the one time pads he or she holds. If one
of the diners is paying he or she adds 1 to the value of the
sum. The results modulo 2 are announced publicly to all
diners. The sum of the 3 broadcast messages modulo 2 is
1 only if the message 1 is sent by a paying diner otherwise
it is 0. Thus a message is broadcast but the identity of a
paying diner is untraceable.
3The security of a classical scheme is deemed to be one
of two varieties: computational or unconditional (also
known as information-theoretic) security [25]. A scheme
which can be broken in principle but requires more com-
puting power than a realistic adversary can access in a
given critical time is deemed computationally secure. Ex-
amples are schemes based on the integer factorization
problem and the discrete logarithm problem. Such com-
putationally secure schemes are under threat from quan-
tum computing. On the other hand, a scheme which
is secure even if an adversary has unlimited computing
resources is said to be unconditionally secure. A one
time pad encryption scheme is unconditionally secure.
Homomorphic maps and mixed nets not based on the
one time pad are computationally secure. Blind signa-
tures can be applied in an unconditionally secure man-
ner to authenticate a vote and sender untraceability pro-
vides anonymity with unconditional security. Chaum’s
secret ballot protocol [26], which uses blind signature and
sender untraceability schemes, allows unconditionally se-
cret voting. The sender untraceability component of the
protocol requires one-time pads between all pairs of vot-
ers, that is N(N − 1)/2 one time pads are required for a
ballot with N voters.
III. QUANTUM PROTOCOLS FOR
ANONYMOUS SURVEYING AND VOTING
In this paper we examine a number of quantum proto-
cols for ballots [32, 33]. In light of the foregoing classical
schemes, we desire the ballots to satisfy the following
general rules:
(R1) The vote of each voter should be kept secret from
all other voters.
(R2) The person (the tallyman) calculating the collec-
tive quantity should not be able to gain information
about the voting of individual voters.
(R3) The votes should be receipt-free. This is to say
that it should impossible for a voter to prove how
they voted to a third party, even if they wanted to.
This condition thwarts vote buying and ensures the
uncoercibility of the voter.
An additional rule applies for the special case of a re-
stricted ballot where the range of values of each vote is
restricted:
(R4) A voter may not make more than one vote, that
is, the value of each vote should not count as more
than one vote.
We call a ballot where the votes are restricted to being
binary-valued a binary-valued ballot. A specific example
is a simple referendum. We call a ballot that satisfies the
first three rules but not the fourth an anonymous survey.
Additional (ancillary) people may be involved in the
ballot, but they must not have access to any more infor-
mation about the voting than the tallyman. There are
a number of different kinds of ballots depending on the
nature of the ballot question and the collective voting
information required.
A. Comparative ballot
The first quantum voting protocol we shall describe is a
simple comparative protocol which we call a comparative
ballot. Consider two voters, Alice and Bob, voting on
a question with a response of either ‘yes’ or ‘no. There
is also a tallyman, whose principal aim is to determine
whether or not they agree, i.e., whether or not they have
cast the same vote.
We wish the result of this comparison task to be de-
terministic and always correct (i.e. unambiguous). It
should be noted in this context that, if instead of classi-
cal information, we wish to unambiguously compare pure
quantum states, then certain restrictions would apply. In
particular, the possible states would have to be linearly
independent [27].
Alice and Bob are assumed to be at spatially separated
sites A and B. The protocol entails beginning with the
ballot state representing one particle shared between the
two sites A and B:
|C0〉 = 1√
2
(|1, 0〉+ |0, 1〉) . (1)
Here, |n,m〉 ≡ |n〉A ⊗ |m〉B represents n particles
(bosons) occupying a spatial mode at site A and m
particles occupying an orthogonal spatial mode at site
B in second quantization notation. A voter makes a
‘yes’ vote by applying the operator exp(iNˆpi), where
Nˆ is the voter’s local particle number operator and
exp(iNˆpi) |n〉 = exp(inpi) |n〉. A ‘no’ vote is cast by sim-
ply doing nothing, which formally amounts to applying
the identity operator. If both voters make the same vote,
then the ballot state is unchanged (up to a possible over-
all sign inversion.) If, on the other hand, their votes are
different, then the ballot state is transformed into
|C1〉 = ± 1√
2
(|1, 0〉 − |0, 1〉) , (2)
where the sign ± depends on who votes ‘yes’. At all
times, the voter at one site cannot determine the vote
cast at the other site. This is because the reduced density
operator representing the state of the particle at each site
is always the maximally-mixed state (|0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1|)/2.
The voting is kept strictly private to the respective vot-
ers.
The two-particle state is then transferred to the site
of the tallyman who performs a measurement in the ba-
sis (|1, 0〉 ± |0, 1〉)√2. The tallyman is able to discern
whether the voters have made the same or opposite vote
4even though he is unable to determine how each voter
cast their vote. This situation is similar in some respects
to the Deutsch-Jozsa algorithm for deciding the balanced
or unbalanced nature of a binary function [28]. Also the
single particle state in Eq. (1) is the same state used
in the data hiding protocol of Verstraete and Cirac [29].
Whereas in Ref. [29] a third party stores a secret in the
state shared by Alice and Bob, here it is Alice and Bob
who store secrets in the shared state. Our protocol satis-
fies rules 1 and 2 of private ballots, namely each vote is is
known only to its corresponding voter, and the tallyman
has access only to the collective (comparative) informa-
tion. The potential for cheating is limited by the very
nature of the comparative ballot; voters can only make
a single vote. The application of an operator other than
exp(iNˆpi) is interpreted as indecision in the sense that
the result of repeated identical ballots is stochastic.
B. Anonymous survey
In the above protocol, the voting information was
stored in locally inaccessible phase factors in a entangled
state. This technique can be applied to other situations
where we wish to maintain anonymity. One such scenario
is as follows.
Let us suppose that the chief executive officer (CEO)
of a firm wants to gauge the effect of a possible action;
he surveys the opinion of his management team to find
out what each member thinks the likely profit (or loss)
will be. To avoid the dishonest responses due to rivalry,
grovelling, fear of repercussions etc., the CEO wants the
survey to be anonymous. The managers must report the
estimated profit or loss for their particular department.
The CEO is interested in the total for the whole com-
pany. An alternative, but essentially equivalent, situa-
tion is that the managers estimate the total profit or loss
for the firm as a whole, and the CEO wants the aver-
age of the estimates, that is, the sum of the estimates
divided by the number of managers. In both cases the
sum of the estimates is made public and the individual
amounts are private. We call the protocol for determin-
ing the sum while keeping the individual amounts secret
an anonymous survey.
An anonymous survey should obey the rules R1-R3.
We now describe a quantum protocol that satisfies these
rules. We retain the general terminology of ‘voters’,
‘votes’ and the ‘tally’. The basic principle of the protocol
involves a two-mode discrete phase state [30, 31] shared
between the voters and the tallyman. A vote is made
by translating the phase value of the phase state. Due
to the shared nature of the state, the actual value of the
phase is hidden from both the voters and the tallyman
in a manner analogous to secret sharing [29].
We again use a system of identical particles in the
second quantization formalism. We employ N particles,
where N is equal to or larger than the number of voters.
The particles are prepared in the following ballot state:
|B0〉 = 1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
|N − n, n〉 , (3)
where |n,m〉 ≡ |n〉T ⊗ |m〉V and |n〉V ( |n〉T ) represents
n particles localized in a spatial mode at site V (respec-
tively T ). The sites V and T are assumed to be remote
from each other. Voters have access only to V and not
T , whereas the tallyman has access only to T and not V .
Voter i makes a vote by applying the phase shifting op-
eration exp(iNˆV δi) to the spatial mode at site V , where
NˆV |n〉V = n |n〉V and δi = νipi/(N +1) for a vote corre-
sponding to an amount νi . For example, after the vote
of the first voter the ballot state becomes:
|B1〉 = 1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
exp(inδ1) |N − n, n〉 . (4)
The second voter makes a vote in a similar manner with
the phase shifting angle δ2 . This voting process is re-
peated for all voters. The resulting ballot state after the
mth voter is
|Bm〉 = 1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
exp(in∆m) |N − n, n〉 , (5)
where ∆m =
∑m
i=1 δi . The net value of the accumulated
votes is Mm =
∑m
i=1 νi which can be deduced from the
final phase angle using
∆m =
2piMm
N + 1
. (6)
Note that at any point in this operation the tallyman,
who does not have access to the site V , can only see the
mixed state
TrV (|Bm〉 〈Bm|) = 1
N + 1
N∑
n=0
(|n〉 〈n|)T , (7)
which is invariant under the phase shifting operation.
Likewise, the voters, who do not have access to the site
T , can only see the mixed state
TrT (|Bm〉 〈Bm|) = 1
N + 1
N∑
n=0
(|n〉 〈n|)V . (8)
The voting of individual voters is therefore secret from
other voters and the tallyman.
At the end of the survey the particles at site V are
translated to a mode at site T so that the ballot state
is as in Eq. (5) but with |n,m〉 ≡ |n〉T ⊗ |m〉T . We
imagine that the tallyman has access to both modes at
site T . The states |N − n, n〉 form an orthonormal basis
for an N + 1 dimensional subspace. We define another
orthonormal basis as follows [30]:
|Tn〉 = 1√
N + 1
N∑
k=0
exp(inkθ) |N − k, k〉 , (9)
5where θ = 2pi/(N + 1) and
〈Tn|Tm〉 = δnm . (10)
The ballot states are all eigenstates of the tally operator:
Tˆ =
N∑
n=0
n |Tn〉 〈Tn| . (11)
To find the tally, the tallyman finds the expectation value
of the tally operator which yields:
〈Bm| Tˆ |Bm〉 =Mm . (12)
The tallyman can access the tally only once he is in
possession of all particles. The voting of individual
voters is kept secret from both the tallyman and the
voters while the particles are shared between the sites.
Attack by colluding voters. Two voters, A and B, can
collude in the following manner to deduce information
about other voters. First we write the ballot state as
|B0〉 =
√
N + 1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
|ψ(θ)〉 |φ(θ)〉 dθ , (13)
where the single-mode phase states [30] are given by
|ψ(θ)〉 = 1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
e−inθ |N − n〉 , (14)
|φ(θ)〉 = 1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
einθ |n〉 . (15)
Imagine that voter A locally measures the phase of
the system at the voting site; this will project the
system onto a state of the form |ψ(θ′)〉 |φ(θ′)〉, where
θ′ represents the outcome of the measurement. The
tally M of votes of subsequent voters then accumulates
locally in the phase of the local system, resulting in
the state |ψ(θ′)〉 |φ(θ′ +Mδ)〉. Subsequent measure-
ment of the phase by voter B and comparison with
the phase measured by A will then reveal the amountM .
Detection of attack. We note that the ballot state, in
the absence of the attack, has a fixed number of particles
N . In contrast the projection onto a phase state induces
a distribution of particles, and so the attack alters the
total particle number on average. Thus the attack can be
detected by the tallyman making a measurement of the
total particle number Nˆ and checking if it differs from N .
The probability of detecting the attack by this method
is 1 − PN where PN = 1/(N + 1) is the probability of
finding N particles in the state |ψ(θ′)〉 |φ(θ′)〉.
Defence. A defence against this colluding attack is to
use a multiparty ballot state such as
|B′0〉 =
1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
|K(N − n), n, n, · · · , n〉 , (16)
where |i, j, · · · , k〉 ≡ |i〉T ⊗ |j〉V1 ⊗ · · · |k〉VK for K voting
sites Vi, i = 1, · · · ,K where K is equal to or larger than
the number of voters. Each voter i is assigned a unique
voting site Vi for casting a vote as before, i.e. using the
phase shifting operation exp(iNˆViδi) to the spatial mode
at site Vi. The colluding attack is foiled because each vot-
ing site is used by a single voter. The final multipartite
ballot state is
|B′m〉 =
1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
exp(in∆m) |K(N − n), n, n, · · · , n〉
(17)
and the corresponding multipartite tally operator is given
by
Tˆ ′ =
N∑
n=0
n |T ′n〉 〈T ′n| , (18)
where
|T ′n〉 =
1√
N + 1
N∑
k=0
exp(inkθ) |K(N − k), k, k, · · · , k〉 .
(19)
After all the particles are translated to the tallyman, the
tallyman determines the value of the tally from the ex-
pectation 〈B′m| Tˆ ′ |B′m〉 = Mm in the same manner as
before.
C. Anonymous binary-valued ballot
A special case of an anonymous survey is an anony-
mous ballot for binary-valued votes which we call an
anonymous binary-valued ballot. A simple referendum
would be a specific example of this kind of ballot. Here,
instead of votes being an arbitrary integer, each vote is
of a binary nature, ‘yes’ or ‘no’, corresponding to an an-
swer to a public question. The anonymous survey proto-
col above could be used for an anonymous binary-valued
ballot provided the voters were honest and restricted
their vote value accordingly. For example, voter k could
choose a phase shift angle of δi = 0 for a ‘no’ vote and
δi = 2pi/(N+1) for a ‘yes’ vote. The tallyMm in Eq. (6)
then corresponds to the number of ‘yes’ votes (the num-
ber of ‘no’ votes being calculated from the number of
participating voters less Mm). There are special situa-
tions where it is in the voters’ interest to vote honestly,
for instance, where the public ballot question is one of
a personal nature (requiring anonymity) and where the
voters want to know the true proportion of voting popu-
lation sharing the same view. Of course, in general, the
voters may be tempted to vote more than once and, for
example, a voter may choose δk = 4pi/(N + 1) to record
two ‘yes’ votes. It is therefore important that rule R4 is
enforced in anonymous binary-valued ballots.
The underlying reasons why the anonymous protocol
does not satisfy R4 are rather simple and quite general.
6Consider two parties Alice and Bob, and the entire initial
ballot state |B0〉. Let YA and YB be the unitary operators
used by Alice and Bob respectively to register ‘yes’ votes.
It is assumed that they would both vote ‘no’ by applying
the identity operator. Any tensor product structure aris-
ing from, e.g., Alice and Bob registering their votes on
different systems is taken to be implicit in these defini-
tions. Let us now consider the implications of anonymity
and define
Ω = ||(YA − YB)|B0〉||, (20)
where |||ψ〉|| ≡ 〈ψ|ψ〉. Anonymity requires that for either
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote, it should be impossible to determine
who made this vote. It therefore requires that Ω = 0.
Let us now suppose that one of the parties, say Alice,
wishes to cheat. She wishes to vote ‘yes’ twice by making
it appear as though both she and Bob have voted ‘yes’,
where Bob is some other voter who has voted ‘no’ (and
in a sufficiently large ballot that such a party exists is
a fair assumption). Suppose that Alice votes after Bob.
Then, for Alice’s cheating to go undetected, the states
YBYA|B0〉 and Y 2B|B0〉 must be completely indistinguish-
able. That this is the case under conditions of anonymity
can be seen from
||(YBYA − Y 2B)|B0〉|| = ||YB(YA − YB)|B0〉|| = Ω , (21)
where the last step follows from the unitary invariance
of the norm. Under conditions of anonymity, Ω = 0
and so the two states are completely indistinguishable,
concealing Alice’s actions.
We may also require that Alice can cheat undetected
irrespective of the order in which she and Bob cast their
votes. This will be the case if
[YA, YB]|B0〉 = 0 . (22)
This condition is automatically satisfied if Alice and Bob
register their votes on different systems, or the same op-
erators if they use a common system, as is the case in the
protocol we have described.
It follows that to protect against this kind of cheating
strategy, some of the properties of the protocol must be
changed. The key one seems to be unitarity. It is there-
fore interesting to explore the possibility of maintaining
anonymity yet preventing cheating if we drop unitarity
and use irreversible operations to register votes. We will
now see that doing so does allow for a certain degree of
improvement. In particular, we will see how the use of
irreversibility can limit the extent of one party’s cheating
to a mere 0.5 votes, and only at the expense of reduced
privacy, in contrast with the limitless extent to which
they can cheat using unitary operations with impunity.
The possibility of cheating can be restricted by intro-
ducing an element of irreversibility into the voting pro-
cedure. One way of doing this would be to restrict the
operation able to be performed by each voter to the ap-
propriate values by directly restricting the macroscopic
devices used to perform the voting operations. However,
since the restricted device is not in the total control of
the voter (by necessity) it seems likely that evidence of
the action taken by the voter could be traced in the lo-
cal environment and so criterion R1 is not guaranteed
to be satisfied. This is clearly a general problem with
irreversible operations.
One way to restrict the votes without macroscopic
means is to replace the initial ballot state Eq. (3) with
|B′′0 〉 =
1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
|2(N − n), n, n〉 , (23)
where |i, j, k〉 ≡ |i〉T ⊗ |j〉V1 ⊗ |k〉V2 and V1 and V2 label
two voting sites which are controlled by two ballot agents
A1 and A2, respectively. Each voter privately records
their vote in a (separate) pair of qutrits (i.e. a pair of
spin-1 systems) with the state (|0,−1〉+ |−1, 0〉)/√2 for
a ‘no’ vote or the state (|0, 1〉 + |1, 0〉)/√2 for a ‘yes’
vote. Here the qutrit states |−1〉, |0〉 and |1〉 correspond
to eigenstates of the z component of spin. One qutrit is
given to each of the ballot agents who locally apply the
operation
exp[iNˆ (1)δ( 1
4
+ 1
2
σˆ(1)z )]⊗ exp[iNˆ (2)δ( 14 + 12 σˆ(2)z )] , (24)
where δ = 2pi/(N+1), σ
(i)
z is the z component of spin for
qutrit i at site Vi , and Nˆ
(i) operates on the spatial mode
in |B′′0 〉 at site Vi. This allows the votes to accumulate in
the discrete phase angle as before and ensures that each
voter casts a single vote.
Attacks by ballot agents. The 2 separated ballot agents
cannot separately learn the nature of the vote with cer-
tainty. For example, one ballot agent may measure the z
component of spin on the qutrit at his site. This would
reveal the nature of the vote only half of the time.
Defence: tamper evidence. The attack by the ballot
agents will result in the qutrit pair being in a product
of eigenstates of the z component of spin. Thus to de-
tect the attack, the qutrit system should be immediately
returned to the voter following the action by the ballot
agents, and be subjected to measurement in a basis which
includes the states representing ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes to de-
termine if the state has been changed. The attack will be
detected one half of the time. Any instances of changed
states are made public, and hence attempted cheating by
a ballot agent will be detected, on average. The qutrit
system is therefore tamper evident, on average, in this
sense.
Alternatively, the privacy of the vote can be increased
by increasing the number of ballot agents and the number
of qutrits used to store each vote. For example, in a 3-
qutrit, 3-ballot agent scheme, the ballot state would be
|B′′′0 〉 =
1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
|3(N − n), n, n, n〉 . (25)
The votes would be made by preparing the states
(|0, 0,−1〉 + |0,−1, 0〉 + |−1, 0, 0〉)/√3 for a ‘no’ vote or
7the state (|0, 0, 1〉+ |0, 1, 0〉+ |1, 0, 0〉)/√3 for a ‘yes’ vote,
and each ballot agent Ai applies the operation
exp[iNˆ (i)δ( 1
6
+ 1
2
σˆ(i)z )] (26)
to their local qutrit system and the spatial mode of
|B′′′0 〉. A measurement of the z-component of spin of one
of the qutrits by a ballot agent will now reveal the value
of the vote only one third of the time, making the vote
more private.
Attacks by voters. A voter need not prepare the
states corresponding to a ’yes’ or ’no’ vote. Indeed,
he may try to maximize the value of his vote, for
example, by preparing the qutrit pair in the cheat
state |1, 1〉. The action of the operator in Eq. (24)
applied by the two ballot agents then increases the phase
angle of the ballot state by 3δ/2, that is, by 1.5 votes [34].
Defence: tamper-evidence versus vote-value tradeoff.
The attack by the voter may increase the value of the
vote, but this is at the expense of abandoning the tamper-
evident nature of the qutrit system. A measurement of
the z component of spin of one of the qutrits in the cheat
state will reveal the value of the vote without altering
the state; this allows a ballot agent to determine the vote
without being detected. Hence, a voter may cheat by a
half vote but only at the expense of losing the privacy of
his vote.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have introduced quantum protocols for ensuring
the anonymous voting in a number of different scenarios.
Central to the protocols is the ballot state, which is an
entangled state shared between at least two sites. The
ballot state stores the tally of the votes which are reg-
istered using local operations. At all times the value of
the vote tally stored in the ballot state is not available
at any one site, but only in the collection of the sites.
The ballot therefore represents a distributed memory and
this property ensures the privacy of each vote and thus
the anonymity of each voter. After all votes have been
made, the vote tally can be determined by a collective
measurement.
We identified 4 rules (R1-R4) which lead to desirable
properties of anonymous ballots. The different kinds of
ballot depend on the ballot question, the collective infor-
mation required and the subset of rules. We described
protocols for a comparative ballot, where the ‘yes’ or
‘no’ answers of two voters are compared, an anonymous
survey, where the voters make anonymous votes of inte-
ger value, and an anonymous binary-valued ballot, where
the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers to a ballot question are tallied
anonymously. We note that an anonymous binary-valued
ballot is closely related to an election, and indeed, it cor-
responds to an election for the special case of two candi-
dates. We are currently exploring other possibilities.
We have analyzed our protocols against a number of
attacks. In particular, we found that for the anonymous
binary-valued ballot the cheating by a voter is associated
with reduced security. In one variant of the protocol,
while the value of the vote of an honest voter is 1, a
dishonest voter can make a vote of value equal to 1.5 and
essentially cheat by 0.5 vote. However, this occurs at the
cost of reduced privacy since the tamper-evident nature of
the protocol, which allows the voter to detect an attack
by a ballot agent, is only available if an honest vote is
made. The various schemes are unconditionally secure
on average in the sense that attacks can be detected with
non-zero probability.
For comparison, we note that Chaum’s classical secret
ballot protocol is also unconditionally secure [26]. The
secrecy is protected through the use of one-time pads
which are shared between all pairs of voters. In a ballot
with N voters, this requires each voter to distribute N−1
one time pads with the other voters. Thus the computa-
tional complexity of the protocol from the perspective of
a voter is of order N . In contract, in our quantum vot-
ing scheme each voter needs to share a single multiparty
entangled state with the tallyman. For example the tal-
lyman could locally prepare a set of spatial modes in the
ballot state and then teleport the states of the entangled
modes to each corresponding voter. The computational
complexity from the perspective of a voter is therefore of
order unity, which is an N -fold reduction.
We also found a related property [34] for our anony-
mous binary-valued ballot protocol as follows: as the pro-
tocol is modified to increase the privacy of the vote, the
restriction on the possible values of an individual vote
weakens. This appears to be a general trade-off property
and we are currently exploring it in more detail. Indeed
our results represent an initial study of this topic and are
not intended to be complete. We hope our results will
stimulate further research into this area.
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